Recently, Harn and Lin (1998) developed a two-phase authenticated key agreement protocol which enables two parties to share multiple secret keys. The first phase of their protocol is the most important part and can be used to deliver a sequence of temporary random public keys to the other party in an authenticated approach. The authors demonstrate an improved version of this novel scheme after giving some cryptanalytic details of the original Harn-Lin scheme.
In the following, for the purpose of demonstrating a possible weakness if the system is not carefully designed and to show how to develop possible modifications, a special example of the protocol will be reviewed. There are two parties A and B involved in the protocol; however, only the role played by A will be described, B acting in a similar manner. Party A randomly selects two shortterm secret numbers k A1 and k A2 and computes their corresponding public counterparts (we call them the temporary random public keys) r A1 = α k A1 mod P and r A2 = α k A2 mod P where P is a prime number and α is a primitive element in F * P . Two mixed parameters are then evaluated as k A = (k A1 + k A2 ) mod (P − 1) and r A = α r A1 ·r A2 mod P . Party A then uses one of the signature schemes reported in [3] for certifying the two public numbers r A1 and r A2 as
where xA is the party A's personal/long-term secret key and sA is the number to be evaluated. 
party B can be convinced of the authenticity and the integrity of both rA1 and rA2 as announced in [1] .
In the second phase of the protocol, a multiple-key distribution/generation process is performed. Suppose that A has already received {r B1 , r B2 , s B , cert(y B )} and has verified the authenticity and the integrity of r B1 and r B2 . Party A then derives
B2 mod P . Only 3 of the 4 keys will be used in order to provide perfect forward secrecy [4] , which means that an adversary cannot deduce all of the shared common secret keys between A and B if one of the keys has been learned. The topic is imporCryptanalysis of Harn-Lin scheme: One straightforward modification of the above protocol is to let
However, it will be shown that this modified key agreement protocol provides no authentication of integrity for both rA1 and rA2. Here, we assume that all the other parts of the protocol remain identical and the equation used to compute s A now becomes
The cheater can arbitrarily select r A1 and r A2 such that
and pass {r A1 , r A2 , s A , cert(y A )} to party B. Evidently, party B will also be convinced of the integrity of both r A1 and r A2 via the same previously mentioned checking equation, i.e., Eq. (2). Owing to the lack of cryptanalysis of the original protocol reported in [1] , it is not clear why r A was chosen to be rA = α r A1 ·r A2 mod P . It is supposed that the main reason is to make the protocol free from the above demonstrated attack. It can be shown that for the above attack to work in the original protocol proposed by Harn and Lin, the following conditions should be satisfied:
But since lcm(P, P − 1) = P (P − 1) > (P − 1) 2 and since r A1 , rA2, r A1 , and r A2 ∈ F * P (and thus ≤ (P − 1)), we have
over the reals. Therefore, given r A1 and r A2 , let q be a small factor of r A1 , then we take r A1 = r A1 /q and r A2 = r A2 ·q. Note that r A1 is divisible by a small factor with high probability; moreover r A2 = r A2 · q will be smaller than P with some probability. Note also that we can try simultaneously with a small factor of rA2. This implies that the original Harn-Lin scheme is not secure. The following example clarifies the claim.
Example 1. Let r A1 = 2, r A2 = 9, and P = 17, then the cheater can forge r A1 = 6 and r A2 = 3.
Fortunately, the previous forgery can be prevented by imposing both rA1 and rA2 to be in the range [ P/2 , P − 1]. Since 2 is the smallest possible factor of either r A1 or r A2 , then either 2 · r A1 or 2 · rA2 will be greater than P . It is therefore impossible for the cheater to find such r A1 and r A2 under this modification.
Improved protocol: A more simple and efficient alternative can be developed which can also be free from the above demonstrated attack; of course, both r A1 and r A2 should be in the range [ P/2 , P − 1]. In this improved protocol, party A computes kA = (kA1 + kA2) mod (P − 1) as before but the parameter rA is not needed now and this eliminates one expensive modular exponentiation computation. The signature generation equation Eq. (1) to certify both r A1 and r A2 is replaced by
and the authenticity and integrity checking equation becomes
faces the situation of solving the impossible problem in Eq. (4) of finding a pair (r A1 , r A2 ) different from (rA1, rA2). It is extremely important to notice the main difference between this improved protocol and the previously mentioned insecure modification. This can be summarized in terms of the signature generation equation as Finally, note that for party B, since the parameter r A is not required, one expensive modular exponentiation computation can also be eliminated, as for party A.
